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INTRODUCTION
Diversity-consciousness in a post-Grutter era has taken
on new meaning than previously conceived in constitutional
jurisprudence. Yet despite the victory of colleges and universities
to use race in student admissions, the full reality of diversity
recruitment is not found in the Grutter1 and Gratz2 decisions
themselves but rather in the implications of the decisions for
another prominent battle that lurks on the horizon: the battles for
race-based financial aid.
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These battles which are sure to ensue with greater
frequency in the coming years appear to be even more of a
critical high stakes struggle that directly implicates the promise of
the expanded diversity interest recognized in Grutter and Gratz.
Indeed, race conscious grants and scholarships are so paramount
to achieving racial diversity that it is likely that many admissions
officials would view the award of race-based grants even more
vital to the effective recruitment, matriculation and retention of
minority students than the mere plus factor use of race in an
individualized admissions process.3
Considering further that many minority applicants are
likely to hail from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the
considerations of cost are likely to weigh heavier than nearly any
other factor in a student’s decision where to attend college.4 As
a member of the admissions committee intimately involved in
minority student recruitment, it is a fact of nature in each
recruitment cycle that many minority students are compelled to
reject prestigious admissions offers faced with the inability to
afford tuition that race-based financial grants might otherwise
make it possible to attend.5
Consequently, college and university admissions offices
are now confronted with a uniquely important challenge. No
longer are we satisfied with a nebulous notion of diversity. As
O’Connor detailed, meaningful racial diversity in the classroom
should translate into a racially diverse set of national leaders. She
writes that if we are to "cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy
in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race."
Accordingly, we know that racial diversity in the
classroom is a compelling state interest by way of looking to the
outcome of such classroom diversity. Maintaining a selective
military officer core from the ROTC ranks consisting of racial
minorities and fostering civic leaders is viewed as a critical benefit
of classroom diversity on college and university campuses.
Another purported benefit is the multicultural competence the
global marketplace demands of employees of prestigious fortune
500 companies who filed the “3-M brief” in the Michigan case.
But herein lies a critical question. Does either the need
for legitimacy by fostering civic leadership from every racial
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
Approximately one in six students deemed as qualified low-income
applicants are African American. See Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences, supra
note 11, at 450; WILLIAM G. BOWEN, SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS 46 - 50 (1998).
5 Maurice R. Dyson, In Search of The Talented Tenth: Diversity, Affirmative
Access and University-Driven Reform, 6 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 41, (2003).
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group, the need for diverse military officers or the need for
multicultural competence in the global marketplace amount to
the same compelling interests upheld in Bakke? Because the
classroom benefits generally claimed for diversity of perspective
was the only compelling interest that Justice Powell upheld, at
least one commentator has suggested the Court misapplied
Bakke.6
By adding additional interest as national legitimacy of
leaders and equal access to leadership paths, it is argued that the
Supreme Court misapprehend the precise compelling state
interest at stake in Grutter and Gratz.7 If so, then are we correct
to conclude that the interest alleged to be compelling was not "a
diverse student body" but rather the "educational benefits" that
presumably flow from such a diverse student body? The
distinction is critical not only for a constitutionally permissible
admission policy, but it is also of critical importance in a financial
aid policy that arguably is designed to further the admissions
office’s use of race to achieve diversity. In the former, the
appropriate remedy is to use race as means in and of itself
whereas in the latter, racial diversity through a critical mass is a
principle means to achieve the educational benefits that flow
from a critical mass.
So what do the Grutter and Gratz decisions tell us about
the legality of race based financial aid or how its legal status
should be construed to support the twin aims of diversity and
legitimacy? Further, to what extent does the Court’s purported
deference to the university’s use of race vis-à-vis a First
Amendment-based academic freedom shield university officials
from concerns regarding race-based scholarships as a means to
achieve campus diversity. How do these decisions fit into the
constellation of past Supreme Court precedent that has attacked
race-based scholarships on grounds that would now seem to
crumble under O’Connor’s ruling in Grutter. How does a
university structure and administer race-conscious financial aid or
can it?
This article will attempt to address these doctrinal
ambiguities and in so doing, suggest some modest claims in
support of the diversity principle as furthered through
constitutionally permissible race-conscious financial aid schemes.
For instance, I would like to begin by attempting to unpack some
the doctrinal complexities that illustrate the yet unanswered
difficulties with race-based financial aid. My principle endeavor
here is to show that although there are means to construct a
6 Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous.
L. Rev. 459 (2004).
7 Id. These include the international competence of future fortune 500
companies and the racial diversity of the military officer core.
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narrowly tailored financial aid program in compliance with Grutter
and Gratz, deference to the goals of legitimacy and diversity
raised by these important cases require us to carefully ponder
whether to import race conscious admissions principles into the
financial aid context. Indeed, it is questionable whether the
guidelines espoused in Grutter and Gratz, even if faithfully
adhered to, would ever feasibly achieve the needed diversity of
underrepresented minorities as a pure admissions question.
The picture, however, appears evens more bleak when
one takes into account the lack of true diversity that will be
reinforced by a race-neutral financial aid scheme that afford little
racial diversity in actuality. Because the Supreme Court indicated
that the University of Michigan’s role was to educate, not merely
admit, future leaders of all races, then it follows that in order to
do so, students must be able to afford to sit in the classroom in
order for the robust exchange of ideas to take place. While I
shall suggest some modest racially neutral means universities may
pursue in devising scholarship programs and the means to
narrowly tailor race-plus factor approaches, it remains painfully
obvious that there is only one clear alternative. Private, racebased, donor restricted financial aid schemes, administered by
universities, promises to be the most effective in terms of
achieving actual diversity of underrepresented minorities.
Unfortunately, it also appears that this option is the least feasible
under Grutter and Gratz and prior precedent. To be sure, beyond
narrow tailoring analysis, state action remains the most
formidable obstacle to such a suggestion. This need not mean,
however, that universities remain constrained. As I shall
elaborate further below, courts and universities would do well to
examine the question of state action in the same conceptual lens
as religious vouchers under Establishment Clause analysis. The
theoretical centerpiece of this article, therefore, is to define the
constitutional contours of this novel proposal and its implications
for overcoming the difficulties of state action.
Overview
Part I begins by briefly reviewing the question of race
based financial aid generally and the concerns of narrow tailoring
as raised by the Podberesky, Grutter and Gratz cases. It also
discussed the problem of state action and the contradictory
treatment of race-restricted grants at various institutions and the
contradictory interpretation of Title VI in these contexts against
the backdrop of Gratz. Part II devotes some attention to the
central question of institutional deference. For instance, to what
extent should deference be accorded in the post-admissions stage
of financial aid determinations. Is there any sound basis to
distinguish how courts should look at race differently in the

5

Journal of College & University Law

[2004

financial aid context than from admissions? Part III explores
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in connection with the question
of disproportionality or disparate impact of funding approaches
that target aid indirectly on the basis of race-related factors. Some
attention is dedicated to the constitutionality of such approaches
that appear designed to circumvent the plus factor approach of
Grutter, yet endeavors to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of racebased aid implicated by Gratz. Part IV discusses the contradictory
interpretations of Title VI with regard to disparate impact
regulations under the DOE and the manner in which this
approach has been abandoned in the Department of Education
(DOE) unrevised policy guidance on race-based scholarships.
Part V provides a nuanced analysis on the factors of narrow
tailoring analysis and the related difficulties of, among other
things, alleviating undue burden resulting from race-based
scholarships. Part VII elaborates on a numerical methodology for
establishing a benchmark by which to measure minority underrepresentation and what qualifies as a critical mass. Part VIII
attempts to show three principle ways in which financial aid may
be allocated to achieve this critical mass of underrepresented
racial minorities. These three approaches include: (1) employing
race-plus considerations in holistic race-conscious allocation
determinations of financial aid; (2) allocating race-based financial
aid directly from university funding while maintaining raceconscious admissions process under Grutter and Gratz and; (3)
administering race-based financial aid selecting recipients for
private donor, race-restricted, grants while maintaining raceconscious admissions process under Grutter. Part IX concludes
with a discussion on the theoretical centerpiece of this article. I
attempt to extrapolate a novel application of the Establishment
Clause analogy to the question of race-based scholarships. While
not identical, the analogy speaks to the real issues of neutrality
and endorsement that remain implicit in the debate of
administering race-base scholarships by universities. I attempt to
show by extrapolating from establishment clause cases an
analytical framework to understand and apply a doctrinal test may
provide a theoretical basis to “immunize” universities from
liability from administering race-based scholarships.
PART I
The Constitutionality of Race-Based
Financial Aid After Podberesky
Neither of the Bollinger cases addresses the constitutional
question of race-based scholarships at colleges and universities.
Further, it is clear that past precedent is of little help in clarifying
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this important question, leading to further doctrinal ambiguity on
the question of race based scholarships. This is particularly so
when one considers that, to date, courts that have had occasion
to consider the question of race-based financial aid have never
considered whether such aid awards are permissible to achieve
the diversity interest recently upheld in Grutter. For instance, in
Podberesky v. Kirwan, the plaintiff Daniel Podberesky was ineligible
to compete for the merit- based Banneker scholarship at the
University of Maryland because he is not African-American
although he met all of the other requirements.8 The court in
applying the standard articulated in J.A. Croson Co.9 to racial
minority scholarships at public universities, required that a party
must, "at a minimum, prove that the [present] effect . . . is caused
by the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient
magnitude to justify the program."10 The University cited four
present effects of the past discrimination, the first of which was
its poor reputation in the African- American community.11 The
court concluded that "mere knowledge of historical fact [of past
discrimination] is not the kind of present effect that can justify a
race-exclusive remedy."12 The University also claimed that the
hostile racial climate on campus justified its program.13 The court
was once again not persuaded, claiming that present incidents of
hostility "do not necessarily implicate past discrimination on the
part of the University, as opposed to present societal
discrimination."14 The University's last two claimed present
effects were based on statistical evidence showing minority
under-representation and rates of attrition.15 In response, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed these on procedural grounds given
conflicting evidence presented by Podberesky.16 The Podberesky
court highlighted the fact that the University had not
demonstrated any attempt at a race-neutral solution.17
Any scholarship distributed along racial lines must also be
narrowly tailored. Prior to the nuanced analysis of the Grutter and
Gratz cases, commentators have reduced this requirement to four
factors: (1) The state must explore possible race-neutral remedies
and approve race-based remedies only when necessary; (2) any
Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 161.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
10 Podberesky, at 153.
11 Id. at 152.
12 Id. at 154.
13 Id. at 152.
14 Id. at 154.
15 Id. at 152.
16 Id. at 155-56.
17 The court also faulted the University and the lower court for using an
inappropriate population that considered all qualified African-American
students as the disadvantaged class, rather than the subclass of Maryland
residents for whom the university intended the scholarship.
8
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race-based remedy must be flexible and temporary; (3) there must
be a statistical correlation between the race-based remedy and the
appropriate population; and (4) the race-based remedy must not
prefer one minority to the exclusion of others.18 Of course,
because Podberesky involved race-based scholarships as a means to
address past discrimination as a near insurmountable burden to
meet, many opponents attacked race-based funding leading up to
and in the aftermath of the Grutter and Gratz decisions. In fact,
recently Princeton and MIT, under complaints from antiaffirmative action activists, were forced to dissolve their
programs for minorities and educationally disadvantaged
students.19 Indeed, it has already been reported that the Center
for Individual Rights is determining which scholarship program
based on high school enrollment to sue.20 Other targets include
minority outreach to high schools and colleges, scholarships,
fellowships in addition admissions schemes.21 Given the
forthcoming onslaught of legal challenges, the contour and limits
of judicial deference to any race-conscious or race-based financial
aid schemes takes on new significance.
PART II
The Powell Deference
Grutter recognized that the use of race to achieve diversity
survives strict scrutiny much easier under a First Amendment
right of a university to constitute its student body as it sees
proper in order to achieve a critical mass of minorities that will
lead to certain educational benefits. The Powell deference to a
university’s academic freedom in Bakke is most apparent in
Grutter to the neutral observer when one reads O’Connor’s
opinion. In it, we are told time and time again by O’Connor that
deference means that racial diversity leads to beneficial
18 William E. Thro, The Constitutional Problem of Race-Based Scholarships and
a Practical Solution, 111 Educ. L. Rep. 625, 633-34 (1996).
19
See,
e.g.,
Austin
American-Statesman,
available
at
http://www.austin360.com/aas/news/ap/ap_story.html/National/AP.V6456
.AP-Princeton-Minor.html (Feb. 7, 2003).
20 See Ron Nissimov, UT Tailors Scholarship to Minority High Schools,
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2002, at A21; Pearce Adams, Reverse Discrimination
Suits Shelve Black Scholarship Aid at UGA, Atlanta J.-Const., July 3, 2000, at B6;
Alexis Orenstein, Minority Scholarships Challenged, Daily Pennsylvanian, Feb.
2,
2004,
available
at
http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/vnews/
display.v/ART/401dfe740db03.
21 Arthur L. Coleman et al, Diversity In Higher Education: A Strategic
Planning and Policy Manual Regarding Federal Law in Admissions, Financial Aid, and
Outreach, 32, at www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/highered/ad/
014624WODiversutyHighrEdT.pdf
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educational benefits and that a critical mass is the best means to
achieve this pedagogical objective.22
Although this is consistent with Bakke, Justice Thomas
did correctly point out that such deference to educational
expertise involved in constituting a student body did not extend
to the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) assertion that the
admission of woman would compromise the quality and nature
of it educational program. For that matter, Thomas’ argument
would apply similarly in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 23
where the Court extended no deference to a nursing school that
sought to deny admission to males because of implicit gender
stereotyping of the nursing profession as most appropriate for
females.
However, what Justice Thomas neglects to understand is
that in VMI and Hogan, the issue presented was whether the
exclusion of a certain class of persons from being admitted to a
state educational institution solely on the basis of their sex
violates the Equal Protection Clause. In Grutter and Gratz, the
issue was not whether a certain class of persons should be
excluded, and certainly not on the basis of sex, but rather to what
extent may a certain class of persons be admitted by special
consideration of their race without running afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause. Accordingly, Justice Thomas misapprehends
the nature of the question presented. The result is an incorrect
understanding of the deference at issue in the Bollinger cases. If
the University of Michigan were seeking to deny an entire class of
persons as in Hogan and VMI, whether it be here all Blacks or all
whites from admission to the University of Michigan, and
assuming further their denial was predicated on some racial
stereotypical perceptions applicable to that entire class, then
Justice Thomas would be more on the correct track. To be sure,
there are racial minorities that would be eligible for admission to
Michigan without the benefit of any race-conscious
considerations. Indeed, there would also presumably be some
underrepresented racial minorities that would also be eligible for
admission without such special consideration. The question, or
questions then become, is whether race-based diversity as an
admissions concept satisfy a compelling state interest; how may
the use of race as a special consideration be narrowly tailored to
minimize any undue burden on non-recipients; whether achieving
a critical mass is the best way of satisfying the narrow tailoring
requirement.

22 Law School defined critical mass as "numbers such that
underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons
for their race." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
23 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).

Journal of College & University Law

9

[2004

However, it is also clear from Thomas’ remarks that at
the very least, such deference must never run afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Guarantee in the
form of a disguised racial quota. Therefore, universities do not
have a free hand or absolute discretion to constitute it student
body entirely as it would see fit. Notwithstanding this, however, it
is not inconceivable that race-based scholarships may have a
second bite at the jurisprudential apple after Podberesky.24 Of
course, the very possibility that race-based financial might be
permissible under the U.S. Department of Education’s still
unrevised 1994 policy interpretation if no other viable alternative
exist, may only further spurn debate about such race-sensitive
financial grants.25 Before Grutter, most race based scholarships in
select circuits could not, practically speaking, survive the “fatal in
fact” standard of strict scrutiny.26 So was it the case with Flanagan
v. Georgetown Coll.,27 where the court held that a set aside of
scholarship funds for minority students violates Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 but in Wash. Legal Found. v. Alexander,28 a
court dismissed a challenge which alleged the United States
Department of Education's change from prohibiting minority
scholarships to allowing such scholarships violated Title VI. But
under Title VI regulations, the question remains murky because
less intrusive, viable means may be available and there may be an
undue burden on those who are ineligible for the funds as a result
of the racial restriction.29 Indeed, some will claim that financial
aid grants based upon economic need rather than race are more
suitable race-neutral alternatives.30 However, this stance fails to
recognize that most studies relying on socioeconomic indicators
alone have proved ineffectual in maintaining previous levels of
racial diversity and largely tend to benefit low socioeconomic
whites instead of racial minorities. However, this point is not
Sara Hebel, The Michigan Rulings: Court Rulings May Open the Door for
More Use of Race in Student Aid, Chron. Of Higher Educ., Jul. 4, 2003, at S6,
available at http://chronicle.com/prm/weekly/v49/ i43/43s00601.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004).
25 Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; Notice of Final Policy Guidance; 59 Fed. Reg. 875601 (Feb. 23, 1994). Under Title VI, private universities operate under the same
constitutional rules of racial preferences as the Michigan Law School in Grutter
but confront the same constraints as the Michigan undergraduate LSA college
in Gratz.
26 Justice Brennan argued that the Court's review under the Fourteenth
Amendment should be strict, but not ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.". See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62.
27 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976).
28 778 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1991).
29 Notice of Final Policy Guidance; 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23,
1994).
30 See e.g., Thro, supra note 9, at 634.
24
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without controversy. Earlier this year, the Century Foundation
released its own study espousing the effectiveness of such
schemes. This report, which is somewhat at odds with the
current position of the federal government, in that it does
acknowledge that there is no adequate substitute for race-based
affirmative action and therefore recommends it be preserved and
considered in conjunction with socioeconomic factors.31
PART III
What Happened To Disproportionality?
Title VI and Its Contradictory Interpretation
In Race-Based Financial Aid
Race consciousness denotes a cognizance of race as being
a relevant factor among many, race-based denotes an assessment
which solely relies upon race in a way sure to lead to a
determinative result.32 Under the Department of Education’s
1994 Policy Guidance, a “college may make awards of financial
aid to disadvantaged students, without regard to race or national
origin, even if that means that these awards go disproportionately
to minority students.”33 This interpretation could potentially
mean that colleges and graduate universities can target urban
feeder high schools or colleges respectively, in ways that are racebased. Many such scholarships that are race-based may
specifically target minority students without specifically
enumerating race as a prerequisite for eligible scholarship
applicants.
In fact, there appears to be some support for this
approach. For instance, under Texas law34, colleges may consider
a number of factors including family income, whether a student is
from an urban or rural school, and how that school fared in the
state accountability ratings in making their admission decisions.35
Additionally, a university could decide, without exposing itself to
liability, to target persons who are first generation college bound
students in their family or who are the first graduate from an
institution of higher education,36 whether the applicant has

31 See Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status,
Race/Ethnicity & Selective College Admissions, http://www.tcf.org/
Publications/White_Papers/carnevale_rose.pdf
32 See Mark Spencer Williams, Skin Formulas Belong In A Bottle: North
Carolina’s Diversity Scholarships Are Unconstitutional Under Grutter, 26 Campbell L.
Rev. 135, 144 (2004).
33 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994).
34 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.804 (Vernon 2001).
35 Id. at (b)(2), (6), (9).
36 Id. at (b)(3).
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bilingual proficiency,37 the financial status of the applicant’s
school district,38 the applicant’s performance on standardized
tests in comparison with those of other students from similar
socioeconomic backgrounds,39 whether the applicant attended
any school which was under a court-ordered desegregation plan,40
and any other considerations the institution deems necessary to
accomplish its stated mission.41
Some other possible race-targeted, race-based
approaches may even prove more novel in application. For
instance, it is conceivable to structure scholarship criteria around
more targeted race related indicia. These include race-based
scholarships that target the victims of sickle cell anemia which are
more likely than not to target African-Americans.42 Likewise,
scholarships based upon students with a Black Studies major, or
membership in the Native American Students Association, Alpha
Phi Alpha or other nonprofit institutions are likely to target
race.43 The same effect may also apply to scholarships targeting
those of the Baptist faith or scholarships targeting those who
simultaneously fall into multiple categories noted above.44
Notwithstanding minorities that would primarily benefit
under these approaches, it is hard to see how the DOE’s
interpretation permitting them could ever comport with the
strongly worded mandate in the Bollinger cases that racial
considerations in financial aid must not be outcome
determinative.45 Further, it is even harder to see how the DOE’s
policy guidance allowing race-conscious financial is able to
circumvent its own implementing regulations regarding
disproportionality. If the DOE states “college may make awards
of financial aid to disadvantaged students, without regard to race
or national origin, even if that means that these awards go
disproportionately to minority students,”46 how is this policy
stance reconciled with a disproportionate adverse impact
analysis?

Id. at (b)(4).
Id. at (b)(5).
39 Id. at (b)(11).
40 Id. at (b)(12).
41 Id. at (b)(18).
42 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml
43 Id.
44 Id. In accordance with these approaches, this does not mean,
however, scholarships can be based upon a membership in organizations
where race or ethnicity is an explicit prerequisite for membership affiliation.
45 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 284.
46 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994).
37

38
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Presumably, if scholarship awards “go disproportionately to minority students”, non-minority students theoretically
would have viable complaint that the scholarship leads to a
disproportionate or disparate adverse impact. The regulations
implementing Title VI, at 34 C.F.R. Part 100, prohibit
discrimination that is the result of different treatment,47 as well as
that resulting from facially neutral policies and practices that have
an impermissible disparate adverse impact.48 The Education
Department=s regulations follow caselaw under Title VI, and as
appropriate, under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, in
applying these regulations. To that end, we learn from Bakke that
Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause and that
from the infamous Alexander v. Sandoval decision there does not
exist a private right to enforce disparate regulations, except
perhaps under Section 198349 and under a formal complaint
lodged with the DOE and pleaded with particularity.50
47 Differential treatment analysis essentially has three parts: (1) Are
there differences in the treatment of minority and non-minority students who
are similarly situated?; (2) Can the recipient justify these differences?; and (3)
Are the recipient=s reasons legitimate or a pretext for unlawful discrimination?
Different treatment cases involve proof of intentional discrimination such that
acts or omissions are on the basis of race, color, or national origin. In
assessing whether actions are race based, intent may be inferred through
consideration of a variety of factors, such as whether the burdens of the
decision are greater for students of particular races or national origins, a
history of discriminatory official actions, departure from the recipient=s norms
in procedural and substantive matters, and evidence of discrimination in
statements made during the history of the action, see Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). A different
treatment violation does not require proof of bad faith or racial motive by
school officials. In these cases, evidence of foreseeable consequences is
relevant, but not necessarily conclusive, in assessing intent.
48 The ability of courts to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations
is demonstrated by the existence of a well-established three-part burden
shifting framework in which a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination, a defendant may offer a substantial and
legitimate justification in rebuttal, and, finally, if a defendant has offered a
proper rebuttal, a plaintiff may establish that the defendant ignored an equally
effective alternative with less discriminatory impact. See generally New York
Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985); SCCIA II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at
540-41, 31 ELR at 20688; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 32, at 799801; See generally, Mank, South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate Impact Suits? 32
ELR 10454 (2002); Mank, South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate
Impact Suits? 32 ELR 10454 (2002).
49 See generally Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Bradford
Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's '602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 321, 332 (2001) (arguing Title VI disparate impact regulations may be
enforced through '1983).Under Title VI, private universities given the same
legal protection from so called reverse discrimination suits if they abide by the
requirements of individualized consideration and narrow tailoring in Bakke and
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It is unlikely that pure race-based financial aid and
scholarships can be narrowly tailored under Gratz. Accordingly,
some commentators have suggested that if it is constitutionally
impermissible to employ a two track system or a set-aside in
student admissions, there is little reason to believe it should be
permissible to employ similar set asides in the award of financial
assistance.51 It is thus at this point that it becomes clear the U.S.
Department of Education’s policy guidance interpretation, while
not carrying the force of law, is clearly at odds with the Gratz
court.
This reality raises several issues about whether the many
restricted grants administered by universities may “cleanse’
themselves from putative suits alleging racial discrimination by
virtue of their participation. To address this question of liability,
it is first necessary to tease out some of the conceptual
distinctions in restricting financial aid allocation that might
implicate potential bases for establishing state action.
PART IV
State Action & Title VI:
Doctrinal Contradictions Abound
Under the U.S. Department of Education’s Policy
Guidance, a specific carve out exception for Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) permits these institutions to
“participate in race-targeted programs for Black students
established by third parties if the programs are not limited to
Gratz with respect to the use of racial preferences. The implications of the
Sandoval ruling are far reaching for civil rights groups as well as private
litigants. Since the rights and remedies under the implementing regulations of
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (at C.F.R. Part 104) and Title IX of the Higher
Education Amendments of 1972 (at C.F.R. Part 106) are the same as those
under Title VI, the decision may have implications for disability and other civil
rights litigants as well.
50 Complicating the matter, however, is that complaints which may be
filed directly with the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), which under the policies of the Bush Administration will need to plead
with enhanced particularity of facts that will support a disparate impact
violation.50 This will mean private citizens will likely need the assistance of
attorneys and other complainants to pool supportive collective statistical data
to supplement their complaint allegations. This data will need to include
specific supportive numerical data and/or anecdotal testimony from
competent witnesses knowledgeable about the adverse racial disparate impact
that will supports the allegation of disparate impact. Absent the production of
very specific evidence, OCR may be reluctant to investigate and enforce
disparate impact complaints. The result could be a smaller window for
recourse.
51 Bloom, supra note 6 at 500-501.
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students at HBCUs.”52 This approach presumably preserves the
mission of HBCUs to educate underrepresented AfricanAmericans so long as it does not institutionally monopolize the
benefit of its efforts to create race-based scholarships. There
nonetheless remains an internal tension with the DOE’s policy
guidance and its differential treatment of NVCC and a HBCU.
As with NVCC, there is a doctrinal preoccupation not
with the source of the funds, but with the university that merely
administers it. However, when a HBCU is involved in
administering and participating in a race-based scholarship, the
inquiry instead turns upon the affiliation status of scholarship
recipients. Why should the question of legality turn upon the
dubious status as one’s affiliation with the participating HBCU?
This apparent contradiction as to the manner in which
NVCC is prohibited from administering race-based scholarships
while HBCUs are precisely permitted to participate in the
administration of these same types of scholarships can hardly be
reconciled by the neutral observer. Nor can the distinction
hardly be explained as a matter of state action that arises with a
public institution on the one hand, and a private institution such
as an HBCU on the other that nonetheless receives federal
funding sufficient to trigger Title VI. One may perhaps conclude
that this difficulty stems from the awkward attempt of the policy
guidance to serve two masters so to speak. It attempts on the one
hand to preserve institutional mission of HBCUs, while
simultaneously seeking to cleanse any perceived institutional
imprimatur on racial discrimination vis-à-vis the administration of
a race-based scholarship. Nonetheless, state action still remains a
formidable obstacle for universities to overcome before allocating
or simply administering race-based financial aid. Moreover,
because Title VI has essentially incorporated the equal protection
clause including its requirement of strict scrutiny, 53 the other
formidable roadblock presented by such scholarships is the
narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.
State Action & Strict Scrutiny Of Restricted Grants
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act may be triggered when
an institution of higher learning selects a recipient for, or
administers a race-based scholarship as such would constitute
state action.54 In those instances where race-based grants are
59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994).
See Angelo N. Ancheta, Revisiting Bakke and Diversity-Based Admissions:
Constitutional Law, Social Science Research, and the University of Michigan Affirmative
Action Cases, March 2003, at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu.
54 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART
52
53
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offered to university students, current law would behoove the
college or university to contact donors to seek revisions to the
terms of the scholarship to bring it into compliance with Gratz.55
Rice University, for instance, has rejected racial restrictions on
scholarships funds donated by its alumni.56 The problem,
moreover, gets a bit thornier when the donor is deceased and
donative intent may be frustrated. In these cases, the institution
would necessarily have to seek modification of the restricted gift
in probate court.57 Absent these options, university officials may
have little other choice than to transfer administration of the
scholarship to completely into the hands of private institutions as
those receiving Title VI funds would be similarly constrained by
Gratz.58
This was precisely the case with the Northern Virginia
Community College (NVCC), which in response to a DOE
complaint filed by a white student, was forced to transfer the
administration of five private race-based scholarships out of
university hands and back to the original donor.59 No longer
could NVCC choose students for the scholarship, and its mission
to serve as a feeder to four year institutions of higher education
appeared to be frustrated.60
In other instances, transfer of funds or the elimination
of the program altogether may be mandated by state law. For
instance, California’s Proposition 209 forbids colleges and
universities from administering aid grants to increase racial
diversity. Other than closing down the aid program, transferring
funds back to donors, or altering the selection criteria of
scholarships, donative intent will ultimately remain frustrated in
the vast majority of cases.61
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
The Department of Educations’ 1994 Policy Guidance does leave
some wiggle room in this regard. Principle 5—“Private Gifts Restricted By
Race or national Origin”—“has been amended to clarify that a college can
administer financial aid from private donors that is restricted on the basis of
race or national origin only if that aid is consistent with the other principles in
this policy guidance.”
59 See Elizabeth Frengel, Using Race-Based Scholarships To Promote Campus
Diversity, Community C.J., Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999, at 21.
60 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions? available at http://infoeagle.
bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/43_4/09_TXT.htm#T10
61 There are some cases in factor where donative intent may be
honored, although it is a matter of fortuitous timing. Funds received before
August 28, 1997 would take priority over the statewide proposition. See
Kantrowitz, supra note 46.
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To circumvent the difficulties that arise in these
contexts, many institutions structure financial aid by a method
commonly referred to as “pooling”. Pooling involves awarding
facially neutral grants to all students on the basis of objective
indicia such as grade point average and financial need for which
matching funds would then be allocated from university coffers
in accordance with specified donor preferences. This option
permits compliance with both donor preferences and the Equal
Protection Clause by relieving any undue burden upon students
who do not meet the race-based eligibility requirements of racebased scholarships.62 Nonetheless, no difficulty would arise with
purely private scholarships such as the Gate Millennium
Scholarship Fund and the United Negro College Fund so long as
the college or university did not raise funds or provide resources
for candidate selection.63
PART V
Narrow Tailoring
Despite this doctrinal obfuscation, what is pristinely
unmistakable is that any incarnation of a narrowly tailored raceconscious scholarship program would have to contain six
indispensable characteristics so as not to transgress the strict
scrutiny of equal protection racial discrimination analysis. They
are: (1) the individualized comparison of applicants—No
minority candidate can be subjected to set aside, quota or dual
tracks designed to shield minority candidates from the crucible of
competition in the admission and financial aid process; (2) the
absence of mechanistic formulas—No minority candidate may be
given individual file consideration by virtue of the automatic
operation of a quota or plus factor that is wholly deprived of
undifferentiated professional discretion and which renders race
outcome determinative; (3) the goal of achieving a “critical mass”
of under-represented minorities—Attempts to achieve a critical
mass must clearly be noted in the mission statement and
permeate admissions policy, registration, financial aid, program
curriculum so as not to appear as sham lip service to racial
diversity without adequate justification. It follows that officials
must be prepared with documented institutional specific data,
surveys, reports, expert summaries, alumni and student
statements and empirical social science data available to properly
62 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml
63 Id.
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buttress the benefits of diversity and its efforts to achieve a
critical mass of underrepresented minorities64; (4) doing “no
undue harm” to members of groups not favored by the system—
Admissions and general counsel must be vigilant in considering
to what extent special consideration of race may adversely affect
other non-minorities or non-underrepresented minorities. It is
rather hard to imagine an instance, however, when a financial aid
package, more so than an admissions decision, would not unduly
harm someone in the binary competition fought between those
who ultimately receive financial aid and those who do not.
However, the more careful and flexible admissions and financial
officers are in opening up the notion of diversity, the less there is
a viable basis for which non-recipients can claim an undue
burden. This is because race-conscious financial aid does not,
alone, necessarily dictate that a student would be foreclosed from
attending a college solely on the basis of race.65 However any
undue burden may also be mitigated and less intrusive if the pool
of financial resources available to non-minority recipients of
financial are much greater.66 Conversely, the burden might be
minimized if the number of non-minority recipients is
considerably small and diffuse.67 There is, however, another
aspect that distinguishes financial aid from admissions that do
not cause undue burden. Further, should any institution prefers
to admit and fund African-Americans to Asian-Americans, for
example, it ought to be prepared to demonstrate through
statistical data and careful internal deliberations that it has
properly reached a sound pedagogical judgment that the
university has a sufficient representation of Asian-Americans on
campus already; (5) a continuing exploration of race-neutral
alternatives—periodic reviews of the use of race by admission
officers and faculty are appropriate from admission cycle to
admission cycle. This does not mean, however, that a university
is compelled to attempt, fail and exhaust every race-neutral
alternative if it is not reasonably calculated to, or likely to yield, a
sufficient number of minority students to constitute a critical
mass admitted under selective criteria before employing raceconscious consideration.68 All that is required is a serious “good
See NACUA NOTES, (May 11, 2004), Vol. 2, No, 2. at
http://ogc.arizona.edu/Race-Conscious%20 Financial%20Aid.htm
65 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions? available at http://infoeagle.
bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/43_4/09_TXT.htm#T10.
66 Arthur L. Coleman et al, Diversity In Higher Education: A Strategic
Planning and Policy Manual Regarding Federal Law in Admissions, Financial Aid, and
Outreach, 32, at www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/highered/ad/
014624WODiversutyHighrEdT.pdf
67 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994).
68 As the majority in Grutter notes:
64
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faith consideration of workable, race neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity” that the institution seeks.69; (6) a realistic
time limit— where deemed appropriate, the implementation of
sunset provisions should occur when the continued use of race is
found no longer to be necessary in order to achieve a critical
mass.70 This point was further underscored by O’Connor in
Grutter. The Court noted that it:
[t]ake[s] the Law School at its word that it would
“like nothing better than to find a race-neutral
admissions formula” and will terminate its raceconscious admissions program as soon as
practicable. . . . [The Court] expect[s] that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today.71
For the majority, the necessity for some finality to all
race-conscious admissions programs “assure[s] all citizens that
the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the
service of the goal of equality itself.”72
However, while only race-based scholarships and
financial aid will not pass constitutional muster under narrow
tailoring analysis, it is clear that race-conscious scholarships may
suffice provided the six characteristics previously noted are
faithfully taken into account. To this end, a number of diversity
factors such as the enthusiasm of the recommenders, the
character of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the
applicant's essay, the difficulty of undergraduate coursework,
extracurricular activities, adversities overcome (i.e. illness, disease,
parental or sibling death) languages spoken, international travels,
good faith consideration does not entail, however,
“exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative” or force an institution between maintaining
a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment
to provide educational opportunities to members for all
racial groups. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344.
69 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2345.
70 These factors are adapted from the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Grutter and Gratz, as well as Michael Madden, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in
University of Michigan Admissions Cases, 1 NACUANOTE 5 (2 July 2003);
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343, citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318, n. 52.
71 Grutter,123 S.Ct. at 2346.
72 Id. (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510
(1989))(plurality opinion); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik,
The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional
Schools, 58 Chi. B. Rec. 282, 293 (1977).
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geographical diversity, graduate degrees, military experience, work
experience, veteran status, parental occupation, parental divorce,
parental abuse, frequent family relocation, playing a musical
instrument, drama, writing, painting, athletics, disability,
orientation, gender, national origin, high poverty neighborhood,
and the applicant's other potential to contribute to student
diversity may all be considered in the selection process for
scholarships.
Another prudent strategy in devising financial aid is to
require students wanting to be considered for diversity
scholarships to write a “diversity of perspective personal
statement” detailing how the student will contribute to the overall
diversity and learning environment of the college and university.
In this way, administrators are less likely to engage in
impermissible racial stereotyping and are better able to assess that
it is establishing a critical mass. Moreover, such an approach
would foster the requisite individualized consideration of each
candidate admonished in Bakke and Gratz while subjecting each
applicant for diversity scholarships to an unshielded, integrated,
competitive process. The use of a diversity of perspective
personal statement is thus, the most prudent approach to
achieving a critical mass.
Moreover, under this proposed scenario, admissions
officials will rely on a personal statement in the admissions
process and a diversity of perspective personal statement for
race-conscious diversity scholarships. Accordingly, it is proper to
assume that the decisions to admit a minority applicant would
both have been further imbued with professional judgments
about the decision to award financial aid to that applicant on a
basis of her diversity of perspective personal statement. Seen in
this way, financial aid is only a conduit by which to reinforce
admissions offers that in turn may be designed to attract and
recruit a critical mass of diversity.
Therefore, it then stands to reason that a minority student
who is admitted and given financial aid is twice the beneficiary of
reasoned, careful consideration by university admissions staff that
have reached a professional consensus that the students will make
a positive contribution to the university. As such, a university’s
exercise of professional discretion to admit and fund a minority
student is twice protected by the deference under the First
Amendment right of academic freedom.
Consequently, it may be of little consequence that a
diversity conscious scholarship is administered in a race-sensitive
fashion primarily to racial minorities so long as other nonminorities receive a financial aid award as well. Neither a
Benjamin Banker Blacks-only scholarship that was at issue in
Podberesky nor the Whites-only mock scholarship offered by a
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Rogers and Williams College Republican student would appear to
pass constitutional muster.73 In fact, it is questionable whether
even universities could target certain ethnicities for scholarships,
no matter how underrepresented they may be on college
campuses across the nation unless the judgment to target the
specific group is carefully documented and the undue burden
upon non-beneficiaries is minimal. Accordingly, scholarship set
asides like those at the University of North Carolina’s for only
Native Americans are legally vulnerable on the same grounds the
set asides of seats at U.C. Davis Medical School in Bakke or
subcontracting set-aside programs in Croson.74 Moreover, UNC’s
approach is also wanting as it is ultimately not likely to yield the
desired results for Native Americans precisely because their own
representation may be called into question by groups such as
Latinos, West Indians, and African-Americans.
In this regard, one can see quite clearly how the words of
Justice Scalia in Grutter gradually starts to take on ominous
importance when he warns: “Finally, litigation can be expected
on behalf of minority groups intentionally short changed in the
institution’s composition of its generic minority ‘critical mass.’ I
do not look forward to any of these cases.”75 In fact, it is this
generic “Black” minority status that can lead to further litigation
among Native Black Americans attempting to procure the same
affirmative action opportunities that West Indians and African
immigrants have received at some of our nation’s most selective
institutions.
This eventuality take on new life when one considers that
that the descendants of American slaves comprise a minority of
West Indian and African immigrants who actually benefit from
affirmative action. These groups, their children and the children
of biracial couples represented the largest portion of Blacks
admitted to the most selective institutions of higher education.76
Recent research confirms that on average, West Indians account
for more than forty-one percent of all “Blacks” at twenty eight
selective institutions including Harvard University, Columbia
University, Duke University, University of Pennsylvania and the
University of California at Berkeley. This forty-one percent
Elissa Gootman, Scholarship, 'Whites Only,' Roils a Campus, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 2004, at A17.
74 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(invalidating a subcontracting set-aside program intended to remedy effects of
racial discrimination for not serving a compelling purpose and not being
narrowly tailored under the Equal Protection Clause).
75 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 See Sara Rimer and Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks,
But Which Ones? N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004 available at www.nytimes.
com/2004/06/24/education/24AFFI.final.html?ex=1403409600&en=92d
f04e0957d73d3&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND
73
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identified themselves as immigrants, children of immigrants, or as
mixed race.77 Given the tension that has arisen over this new
revelation, it would come as no surprise that, as Justice Scalia
further predicts, “other suits may claim that the institution’s racial
preferences have gone below or above the mystical-Grutter
approved critical mass.’”78 Just as Native Black Americans will
seek recourse for the preferred status of immigrants, so too will
the preferred status of Blacks in admissions become the predicate
by which either Latinos or Native Americans will challenge the
suit. Further, with Asians, Asian-Americans and Caucasian
women being among the greatest beneficiaries of affirmative
action, it might be reasonable to expect that another inter-group
conflict this time with West Indians, Africans, and biracial person
is inevitable.
Michigan’s focus on truly underrepresented minorities,
however, has been upheld as laudable among universities that too
often struggle to attract and education underrepresented Native
Americans, African-Americans and Latinos. An admissions
decision to focus solely on underrepresented minorities may very
well be imbued with the professional discretion and judgment
deserving judicial deference.79 The problem may arise, however,
whenever a university may appear to arbitrarily draw artificial
lines of preference between favoring one deserving
underrepresented racial group while ignoring a similarly situated
underrepresented group. In such an instance, a reviewing court
may be wary of placing its imprimatur on what it may see as an
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported distinction between
Native Americans and African-Americans for instance. Here, it is
unlikely that documentation would be as much help as where the
distinction is between an underrepresented group like Latinos
and an often over-represented group like Asian-Americans.80
These difficulties only further buttress an approach where private
donor, race-based, restricted grants is seen as the most targeted
means to recruit underrepresented minority groups since the
77 These numbers are consistent with other reported findings by
sociologist studying this issue:
Douglas S. Massey, a Princeton sociology professor who was one of the
researchers, said the black students from immigrant families and the mixedrace students represented a larger proportion of the black students than that in
the black population in the United States generally. Andrew A. Beveridge, a
sociologist at Queens College, says that among 18- to 25-year-old blacks
nationwide, about 9 percent describe themselves as of African or West Indian
ancestry. Like the Gates and Guinier numbers, these tallies do not include
foreign students. Sara Rimer and Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More
Blacks, But Which Ones?, supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (discussing the
Court's deference to a school's "educational mission" and judgments).
80 Bloom, supra note 6 at 500-01.
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grants themselves have not been provided by the university, but
by private individuals.
PART VI
A Right To Be Preferred?
An unanswered question that arises in the Grutter and
Gratz cases is whether a disfavored racial group would ever have
a constitutional right to a preference in admissions schemes, and
by extension, a preference in the award of financial aid
scholarship and grants under a race plus approach. The principal
doctrinal arsenal on each side can be gleaned with some
imagination. For instance, it is not hard to conjure a situation
where second generation students of southeast Asian Indian
Hindu parents and Pakistani Muslim students challenge a
preference to admit native Black Americans. On a plus factor
analysis, one might say that the former may even bring more
diversifying factors to the table than the latter. Whether it is
linguistic diversity, religious diversity, national origin, political
point of view diversity, international travel, color, etc., we might
very well conceive a scenario where an Indian or Pakistani might
rank higher on the scale of these various diversifying factors than
the native Black American. Of course, the rebuttal on the other
side is also not hard to conceive. Here, it would be argued that
individualized consideration means something more than “adding
all the sum total of all the parts” approach that is devoid of
meaningful discretion and holistic whole file consideration.
Perhaps the Pakistani ranks higher on a number of statistical
indicators, but individualized consideration would look at
character and a voice that is distinctly missing from class debates,
moot court briefs, law review notes and the alumni and
professional practicing community of a law school, university or
college. Individualized consideration means in this context what
contribution can this student make, and will likely make, to the
overall educational community, both nationally and in state.81
In this regard, it is significant that Justice Thomas applauds the
success of Wayne State University Law School in educating students in the
state of Michigan than the university that bears its namesake.
Thomas
appeared to suggest that there can be such a thing as too much diversity when
it comes at the expense of an institution’s own mission. This is a slightly
different argument than suggesting that the implicit choice is between diversity
and selectivity. There is but no question that the University of Michigan is
widely regarded a more selective institution than Wayne State, but as Justice
Thomas notes, the University of Texas maintains its reputation as a selective
institution while educating, by state legislative mandate, resident Texans in half
of its entering class seats. The choice need not be mutually exclusive, although
there may be in the end little choice depending upon the qualifying
characteristics of local demographics from which to constitute an entering
81
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Individual consideration then, is not just a science, but an art
form requiring careful, intuitive judgment gleaned from faculty
recommendations and at some Ivy League institutions, personal
interviews. The counterpoint, one could argue, is that Gratz does
not prohibit quantification or numerical value assignment on
diversifying factors, only the automatic and determinative
assignment of value on the basis of race.82
Moreover, diversity is a moving target, which is in
constant flux depending upon the demographics of entering
classes. In instances where religious diversity is adequately
supported in a critical mass, then diversity may mean something
qualitatively and quantitatively different in successive admissions
cycles where perhaps it is appropriate to look instead at other
diversifying factors such adversities overcome, discrimination
surmounted, etc. There is little difficulty with this approach
because while it may attract more native Blacks than Indians, it
does not guarantee an outcome. Indeed, an Eritrean or Liberian
that has escaped civil war in their home country to emigrate to
American and learn a new language will fare well in the
assessment of diversifying factors, but it does not foreclose the
consideration of language minority Latinos or African-Americans
who have endured daily struggles of discrimination as well.
Moreover, even though there may be a clear preference for
underrepresented minorities such as Native Americans, Latinos
or Blacks in admission and financial aid, it does not necessarily
mean that a critical mass of these groups will actually be achieved
or retained on campus. The revelations that immigrants, Africans
and biracial persons are the beneficiaries of affirmative action
more so than native Black Americans is a strong testament of this
fact. That said, it may be prudent, as one commentator suggest,
that similarly situated groups be given “parity of treatment rather
than simply assuming that the courts will defer to whatever the
university decides to do.”83

student body. Perhaps then, what Thomas suggests is a notion that
individualized consideration that ask this fundamental question: will this
individual contribute to the school’s mission to educate members of the state
bar or future doctors and consultants for the state or region? The problem
arises when universities in states with low a low number of resident minorities
that may have no choice but to recruit from out of state. In these instances,
however, we learn that diversity is fluid and always in flux. Where in state
students are adequately represented, a new characteristic may become a
diversifying factor.
82 See Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis of the University of Michigan
Affirmative Action Cases, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 19 available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/legal_docs/Diversity_ %20
Raffirmed.pdf
83 Bloom, supra note 6 at 501.
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All of these complex issues nonetheless speak to the need
for further nuance and sophistication in how admissions staff
chose to diversity their faculty. No longer is it acceptable for
admissions staff to lump such a diffuse number of distinct racial
groups such as persons from Jamaica, Trinidad, Dominica,
Guyana, Barbados, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, St.
Kitts/Nevis, Antigua, Cape Verde, Kenya, Eritrea, and Nigeria
under the rubric “Black” or “African-American” in order to
diversity their student body. Likewise, the same would apply to
those that fall within the generic “Latino” or “language minority”
categories but nonetheless hail from areas as diverse as the
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica,
Venezuela, Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina and Columbia. Each
bring their own unique perspective and we would continue to do
a great disservice to ignore such a heterogeneous assortment of
backgrounds all for the sake of a shallow conception of what
constitutes diversity. Likewise, we would do a great disservice to
include every diffuse groups by sacrificing or ignoring long
underrepresented racial groups whose voice and presence have
been excluded from the hallowed halls of academia. Moreover,
there is nothing legally suspect with a suggestion that admission
offices be mindful of such racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic
backgrounds of admitted applicants. In fact, if the Court agrees
that closely monitoring acceptance of offers of admission
extended to minority students, will not give rise to an inference
that the institution is maintaining a quota, neither should it if an
admissions office closely monitors the specific racial background
of those that fall within the generic “Black” and “Latino”
nomenclatures.84
Indeed, the way an institution largely satisfies the
requirement of narrow tailoring is by taking account of all
relevant diversifying factors, including ethnicity, national origin
and color, in an individualized and competitive process in both
the admissions and financial aid decisions of a college or
university. Of course, I would even say that we fall short of the
individualized consideration required under Gratz if we were to
maintain the current status quo of minority student selection used
at institutions such as Harvard University, Columbia University,
Duke University, University of Pennsylvania and the University
of California at Berkeley which fail to take into account
differences in “Black” heritage and underrepresented racial
groups.
PART VII
Underrepresentation & Critical Mass
84

See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343.
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Yet as we know from Chief Justice Rehnquist cynical
questioning of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts (LSA) counsel, John Payton, during oral argument, a group
can only be underrepresented if there is a benchmark by which to
measure the purported deficiency of representative numbers.85
Otherwise, how do we know any particular racial minority is
underrepresented?
Unfortunately, something more than a Justice Stewart’s “I
know it when I see it” approach is required to answer this critical
question. The principle difficulty in abiding with the rules of this
logic is that it is designed to fall on its own sword if one is not
careful. For instance, anything that might look like a benchmark
by which one is able to say with any mathematical certitude a
racial group is underrepresented may be a standard, which might
appear dangerously close to the functional equivalent of a
disguised quota. But as Justice Powell noted: “there is of course
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits
to be derived from a diverse student body and the between the
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those
students admitted.”86 To say that some group is
underrepresented is to say that there is some level of
representation that one numerically ought to be entitled to have on
campus. That, to critics, may very well look like a quota. A
quota is a program in which a fixed number or proportion of
opportunities that “must be met or cannot be exceeded is
reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.”87 Likewise, for
some it may appear that the practical difference between a racial
quota and “a numerical aspiration” as nothing more than adept
slight of hand. Not quite so.
For instance, in Grutter it was shown that
underrepresented minority graduates ranged from as low as 5.4%
in 1998 to a high just four year earlier of 19.2%.88 As we now
Id.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 323.
87 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2342 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986)(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
88 Though the range varied considerably, the mean percentage of
underrepresented minority students from 1986 to 1999 was 12.6%. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-42 (6th Cir. 2001); Grutter v. Bollinger,
137 Supp.2d 821, 870 (2001) n. 26. As the district court noted in the original
Michigan admission policy, it stated clearly that:
“…we seem to have achieved the kinds of benefits that
we associate with racial and ethnic diversity from
classes in which the proportion of African-American,
Hispanic and Native American members has been
between about 11% and 17% of total enrollees.
Id. at 21.
85
86
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know in light of Grutter, a good faith effort to “come within a
range demarcated by the goal itself and permits consideration of
race as a ‘plus’ factor” can serve as a permissible numerical
aspiration that may rise or fall in a given year.89 With this in mind,
Professor Bloom suggests some common sense benchmarks as a
place to measure critical mass:
“Representation might be judged by
comparison to the group's percentage in the
national population or its population in the
state or city in which the institution is located,
to a percentage in the school's applicant pool
or percentage in the national applicant pool,
to the percentage admissible without the use
of racial preferences, or to the percentage of
admitted members who choose to attend if
admitted
without
racial
preferences
…Arguably, the most appropriate comparison
would be between the percentage of a
particular minority group's members in the
applicant pool and the percentage of that
group admissible in the absence of racial
preferences.”90
This last suggestion of a possible benchmark appears not only to
be supported by Croson’s observation, as Bloom notes, that a
nonqualified pool would be of little significance as a basis of
comparison. It also appears to be supported by Grutter’s
admonition that the use of racial preferences be used only when
necessary, for a limited time and only when race-neutral
alternatives do not promise to yield a diverse student body. In
fact, only by comparing racial groups in the applicant pool to the
percentage of that group admissible without racial preferences do
we truly come to see the need for race-conscious considerations.
If for instance, the percentage of those minority groups
admissible without so called racial preferences in the overall
applicant pool is significantly lower to the point that a critical
mass cannot possibly be sustained without the benefit of such
consideration, then we know that the use of race-conscious
considerations are warranted for the admission cycle.
PART VIII
Three Proposals For Race Conscious and Race Based
Financial Aid Allocations
89
90

Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2342.
Bloom, supra note 6 at 500.
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Once the admissions offer is extended, there are three
principle ways in which financial aid may be allocated to achieve
this critical mass of underrepresented racial minorities. The first
approach represents the least legally vulnerable doctrinal
approach under current interpretations of Grutter and Gratz,
while the last two approaches represent normative theoretical
proposals to allocate financial aid in a pure race-based fashion.
These three approaches include: (1) employing race-plus
considerations
in
holistic
race-conscious
allocation
determinations of financial aid. The analysis for consideration of
race-conscious financial aid would likewise mirror the analysis for
admission under Grutter and Gratz. This approach is the one most
likely to be endorsed by the courts; (2) allocating race-based
financial aid directly from university funding while maintaining
race-conscious admissions process under Grutter and Gratz. This
approach attempts to distinguish the financial aid context apart
from the admissions context at issue in the Bollinger cases; (3)
administering race-based financial aid selecting recipients for
private donor, race-restricted, grants while maintaining raceconscious admissions process under Grutter. This approach
attempts to offer a theoretical alternative to the current policy
guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Education that
often is filled with internal contradiction in application. I discuss
these three approaches in turn below.
(1) Race Conscious Allocation As A Plus Factor
What I propose here is a multi-step step analysis to be
conducted by a joint admissions and financial aid office staff. The
analysis begins by first asking, is there a critical mass of racial
minorities, both underrepresented and those of various national
origins admissible without race-conscious consideration after
subjecting each applicant to full competition in a one track
admission review process? If so, there is no need for race
conscious consideration in the admission process. If not, race
conscious consideration is warranted. A race plus factor approach
is permissible. Once the admission offer is extended, admissions
staff should ask whether the number of minority students that
have accepted the offer and matriculated constitute a critical
mass. If so, is there a critical mass of students and there is no
need for the distribution of race-conscious financial aid (at least
in the entering year. The analysis may be repeated in order to
retain those upper-class minority students already on campus). If
not, there is a need for individualized consideration of raceconscious scholarships and financial aid to recruit and attract a
diverse critical mass that would actually exist in the classroom.
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What might have looked like a diverse entering class
may no longer be the case if minority students ate unable to
attend because of costs. In other words, the entering class is
threatened to become less diverse without the consideration of
race as a plus factor in financial aid allocations. Therefore, in
order to determine financial aid recipients, finance office staff, in
conjunction with admissions staff, might require each applicant
to write a “diversity of perspective” essay or personal statement
that would take into account all the diversifying factors for the
competitive allocation of financial resources including the
consideration of race. In this fashion, all recipients are placed in
the cauldron of competition on equal footing with no set asides.
Each competes for resources in a matter that will be upheld as
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional strict scrutiny.
(2) University Funded Race-Based Scholarships
Another approach that is admittedly all but certain in
light of Gratz is to distinguish the financial aid context distinctly
altogether from the admission context. In so doing, the doctrinal
reach of Grutter and Gratz would be limited as universities and
colleges could take into account race more freely in order to
achieve a critical mass of underrepresented minorities. But how
is this theoretically possible in light of Grutter and Gratz? In fact,
the majority in Grutter recognized that strict scrutiny must be
applied within the specific context or program in question. As
the court noted, the narrow tailoring “inquiry must be calibrated
to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve
student body diversity.”91 Accordingly, calibration might in fact
differ in the financial aid context than the admission aid context
to address the distinct issues of race and financial need in order
to achieve a student body. To this end, a university must
demonstrate “that the means chosen fit the compelling goals
closely. As the Supreme Court has noted, the fit need not be
perfect, but it must be reasonable and it must “represent not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in
proportion to the interest served.”92
It is possible by reconceptualizing race based financial aid not as a set aside.
When the admissions context ends, it is clearer that all
Blacks, Native Americans and Latinos have competed in a onetier track admissions process. Thus, the very fact that racial
minorities have successfully competed for a seat does not render
financial aid a set aside when its principal aim is to allow the
student remain in that earned seat. This is qualitatively different
from reserving seats in the admissions process as was the issue in
91
92

Grutter,123 U.S. at 2341.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).
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Bakke. In Bakke, special candidates in a separate admissions
program were not required to meet the 2.5 grade point average
cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the general
admission process although sixteen seats were reserved. Nor is it
qualitatively the same as permitting contract set asides as in
Croson that were not subjected to the full unprotected process of
competitive bidding.
Finally, the very fact that the university funded, racebased scholarship would not purport on its terms to compensate
for past discrimination places it on different constitutional
footing than the Benjamin Banneker scholarship at issue in
Podberesky. There, it was clear that the race-exclusive scholarship
suffered from, inter alia, the constitutional defect of insufficient
narrow tailoring precisely because it posed an undue burden to
non-beneficiaries, to wit: non-African-Americans.
But even on this ground, the university funded race
based scholarship still presents no such concern. Financial aid
packages are set based upon information that is compiled by the
Free Application For Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).93 Given the
fact that most schools will reduce their financial aid funds in
direct proportion to funds a student receives from the federal
government, one commentator wonders whether Podberesky
himself would not have seen his race-exclusive scholarship
reduced or received some other form of aid.94 When there is
such an offsetting mechanism in university financial aid based
upon a greater amount of federal funds received, it is quite
difficult to say that one has been unduly burdened by virtue of
the scholarship solely because of their race. Moreover, this type
of compensatory offsetting in financial benefits is wholly
different in character from the zero sum battle for an admission
seat that was denied Jennifer Gratz and Allan Bakke.
A Question Of Merit?
Moreover, it is questionable whether an undue burden
test should apply in the financial aid context. One fundamental
distinction worth noting between admissions and financial aid, is
that in the former, there is an expectation that good grades, good
test cores and a competitive showing on other supposed
“objective” criteria will be awarded in the form of an admissions
offer. To some extent this may also be true of what is referred to
as “merit” scholarships.

93 See Focus on Financial Aid: The Basics, Steps to College (Jan/Feb.
2001) available at http://www. nacac.com/p&s_steps.html.
94 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions?, supra note 59.
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The notion of merit as one’s demonstrated ability or
achievement is but one basis for judicial deference to a university
driven mission where the value of diversity is an alternative, but
legitimate, aim. As opposed to “merit”, the notion of value in
this context signifies a sense of worth in usefulness or importance
to the university. Therefore, the university is best able to
determine how to pursue policies, and allocate aid, in a manner
that consistently reflects these institutional values. Thus, whereas
the intrinsic conception of merit exist entirely in the domain of
individual capacity to leverage academic ability or achievement, it
is an incomplete picture. For when we say there is an extrinsic
value to diversity, we are essentially saying that value is always
relative to the utility and significance any given candidate brings
to the table. But even here, the distinction collapses very often in
the admissions context. But it also in the context of financial aid
decisions where the value of an applicant to a college or university
determiners whether and to what extent a prospective candidate
may receive merit-based aid. There is still little in the way of a
definitive entitlement.
To further illustrate this proposition, consider the
following scenario between two students: Student A and Student
B.
Distinguishing Race-Based Considerations
In The Admissions and Financial Aid Contexts
Student A is a Caucasian male history teacher at Taft, a
prestigious predominantly white boarding school in New
England and a graduate of Princeton University summa cum laude
and Student B, a female minority calculus teacher at an inner city
school who graduated from Hostos Community College and City
College, is known to work well with a diverse set of students. In
an admission context, it is clear Student A is meritorious and will
likely be admitted. It is also clear that Student B is technically
qualified and is also admissible under eligibility criteria. But it
remains uncertain whether Student A has “value” in the same
sense as Student B in a graduate school of education whose
institutional mission is deeply rooted in educating the
surrounding inner city community that has important historic ties
to the university’s founding. The value of Student B,
notwithstanding credentials, may be greater than Student A where
there is a diverse racial demographic of learners and a dearth of
upper-level math teachers in the local community where
graduates of the school are desperately needed. Student B would
be a better “fit” with the institutional values of the graduate
school than Student A who statistically is less likely to teach in
the local community upon graduation or whose record of
teaching experience indicates he would not be as effective
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teaching in a classroom filled with racially and ethnically diverse
math students.
However, in the financial aid context, a different set of
considerations may govern in a good faith attempt to achieve a
critical mass. Student A is able to pay ¾ of his annual tuition. It
is apparent that Student B, on the other hand, has communicated
she is simply not able to attend without scholarship and
fellowship support. General institutional funds available for needbased and female undergraduate math majors are not sufficient to
offer Student B a full ride while still being capable to provide aid
to other students in need. In fact, it is clear that while Student B
would need a full grant in order to matriculate, a great number of
other non-minority, male and female students would need the
same amount as well. Student B would qualify for the only
additionally available funds: (1) a race-based university
administered scholarship offered by a private donor and; (2)
funds that are potentially available to Student B as a raceexclusive scholarship if the law permits it. Are there different
considerations in taking race into account the same in the
financial and context than in the admissions context? Should
Grutter and Gratz be extended to financial aid scenarios like these
playing out across the nation? Is there a basis for a distinction in
financial aid that would permit the university to dedicate the lion
share of institutional funding of race based aid to Student B while
not allocating a similar amount to Student A?
The above scenario indicates that in the grand expanse
of financial aid that may include scholarships, there remains no
single entitlement to aid based upon some universal notion of
merit and value. No one is guaranteed or entitled to receive
financial aid. Accordingly, it is hard to argue that one has been
unduly burden by the denial of financial aid solely because of
their race. Many factors may play into the decision to award and
not to award aid that an expectation that one is entitled to receive
a general institutional grant may be regarded as unreasonable.
Further, a college or university may decide to extend funds based
upon athletic ability, linguistic skill, Scottish lineage,
undergraduate major, left handed dexterity and a host of other
bases that are likely to exclude many minorities in a manner that
is sure to unduly burden some. Yet, it can hardly be said that
these minority non-beneficiaries are excluded from financial aid
as a whole on the basis of their race. Likewise, the same applies
to white students who may inconveniently fall outside the
purview of these scholarship eligibility criteria.
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Discretion, Legitimacy & Selectivity
More so than in the admission scheme, the award of
financial aid is a matter of greater institutional discretion and the
discretion of scholarship donors. Alumni, research foundations,
fellowship programs, national and regional professional
associations as well fortune 500 companies such as those featured
in the “3-M Brief” may very well grant restricted and unrestricted
discretionary funds to learning institutions that will ultimately
comprise a reserve pool of university funded scholarships and
university administered scholarships. In the exercise of its
reasoned discretion, many donors may well conclude that the
contribution of funds or the allocation thereof best represents
what they believe are the best return on its investment. That
judgment should not be impinged upon or frustrated merely
because of judicial interference. Furthermore, for universities, an
additional layer of discretion permeates decisions in the allocation
of funds, whether donated or even if the monies are directly
fundraised by university official themselves in order to execute its
own policies. Thus, financial aid allocations may very well
embody a policy to fund students it believes may potentially
contribute to a skilled, but underrepresented workforce more
generally and perhaps to the workforce of these donors in
particular. In any case, the policy judgment of donors and
universities require a modicum of judicial restraint when it comes
to how these important institutions achieve racial diversity
through financial aid.
But if the exercise of professional and academic
discretion in the allocation of grants are not enough to accord
judicial deference, intrusive judicial oversight in the use of race in
financial aid is troubling for yet another reason. Just as students
do not possess a legal guarantee or entitlement to financial aid,
neither do they have such a guarantee when it comes to how
much a student may receive of financial aid. For the judiciary to
second guess whether “Student A” should in fact have receive
more grant funds than Student B” or an equal amount would
embroil the bench in the policy judgments that go to the core of
a university’s institutional mission and autonomy and its entitled
deference to achieving the real pedagogical benefits of diversity.
This last component is of critical importance.
Observers will recall Grutter’s pronounced discussion of the
“real” benefit of race-based diversity, rather than mere
“theoretical,” to wit, it yields a credible legitimacy when national
leadership is diverse.95 Justice O’Connor writes:

95

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
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In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence
in the openness and integrity of the
educational institutions that provide this
training.96
Education is key to national legitimacy because, for O’Connor,
it provides the training ground for a diverse national leadership
to develop. This diverse leadership in turn fosters a sense of
legitimacy of a democratic nation that reflects all of its
citizens.97 Accordingly, the critical mass analysis must be
performed twice to ensure that of those admitted, there is an
actual critical mass or racial minorities who can afford to
remain on campuses through scholarships as this is the only
way universities can ever begin “to cultivate a set of leaders.”
Therefore, the question of legitimacy extends not only
to ensuring a diverse set of national leaders, but to the very
institutions themselves that are charged with the responsibility
to create those leaders. In declaring that “all members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions”, O’Connor
indicates that legitimacy is not just on the macro level of
national leadership, but it also implicates the micro level of
individual feeder institutions. This important legitimacy, in
turn, engenders a parallel level of accountability that rests on
each individual institution to fulfill it commitment to educate
every American of every hue, national origin and race, both as a
democratic and economic matter. Accordingly, when viewed
in this way, it is clear why Michigan chose not to simply lower it
admissions standards as Sacalia suggested.
Scalia nonchalantly stated to Michigan Law School
counsel, Ms. Mahoney:
“Now, if Michigan really cares enough about
that racial imbalance, why doesn't it do as
many other State law schools do, lower the

Id. at 2341.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 312-313
(Powell, J., concurring)(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967))(“[T]he ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples.”
96
97
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standards, not have a flagship elite law school,
it solves the problem."98
But query whether it does. If, as is suggested above, there is
indeed a macro and micro level of legitimacy concerns, and if
there is a direct nexus between the legitimacy of national
leaders and those of feeder institutions respectfully, then it is a
non sequiter to suggest that simply lowering the standards “will
solve the problem.” The fact remains that the legitimacy of
future national leaders a university may produce depends in no
small measure upon the confidence we put into the institution’s
legitimacy that produced these leaders in the first instance.
Therefore, a university that lowers its standards may very well
be less respected in leadership circles and in global markets. In
a way that undermines the needed legitimacy of our leaders of
color.
The ramifications of Scalia’s suggestion to lower
standards also means the military will have less educationally
prepared officers to assume leadership reigns that became such
a critical concern of several prominent retired military generals.
The idea is that because racial diversity will ensure broad
legitimacy in a racially and ethnically diverse world, the face of
America must resemble those of its officer core (and other
nations that have long seen their interest diametrically opposed
to our own). The group of twenty-nine retired military and
civilian leaders, included General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,
who directed the allied forces in the 1991 Gulf War, Robert
McFarlane, who was President Reagan's national security
adviser, Admiral William T. Crowe, who was chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1989, and General Wesley
Clark, who was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from
1997 to 2000. These military officers also took note of the
nexus between legitimacy and racial diversity:
In the interest of national security, the
military must be selective in admissions for
training and education for the officer corps,
and it must train and educate a highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a
racially diverse educational setting. It
requires only a small step from this analysis
to conclude that our country’s other most
selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective. Like our military
98 See United States Supreme Court Transcript at 30-31, Grutter (No.
02- 241) (Oral Argument of Maureen E. Mahoney for Respondents Lee
Bollinger et al.)
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security, our economic security and
international competitiveness depend upon
it. An alternative that does not preserve
both diversity and selectivity is no
alternative at all.99
In their brief, it is clear that the generals comprehend the dual
nature of preserving diversity without sacrificing selectivity and
international competitiveness in the same manner that Ms.
Mahoney and the prestigious corporations in the 3-M Brief also
suggest. On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Scalia and Thomas’s response seems to suggest that these twin
aims are mutually exclusive. Perhaps they are. However, it is also
logical to assume that sacrificing entry standards of flagship
institutions altogether as they suggest will do more to harm global
competitiveness, multicultural competence and national security
overall than to give only a plus factor consideration to racial
diversity. If there were any rebutting arguments or evidence to
suggest this would not result from disregarding selectivity and
diversity, it was not forthcoming from these skeptical justices.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, race neutral alternatives hardly
promise at this current time to be effective in attracting racial
minorities as it does poor whites. Thus, without a race-conscious
scholarship program, universities may fail to adhere to their
inherit democratic function to educate all racial groups. But even
here, it remains an open question whether even marginally
weightier race-conscious plus factors can even lead to the
meaningful critical mass numbers in the final analysis when
among other diversifying factors are calculated in the applicant
pool.100
Indeed, one primary economic justification for tax
exemption of colleges and universities under market failure
theory is relevant to the military generals and O’Connor’s
diversity concerns because education is viewed as a public good
which is not democratically distributed to all.101 In essence, the
subsidy the federal government extends by recognition of tax
exempt status to higher education institutions is an important
recognition of their importance to educate leaders and an
informed citizenry.102 Therefore, arguably universities fulfill their
99 See Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. at 2930, Grutter (No. 02-241).
100 Bloom, supra note 6, at 504-05.
101 See Lester M. Salmon, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER
7-9 (1992).
102 This is the classic justification under “subsidy theory”, see H.R. Rep.
No. 75-1860, at 19 (3d Sess. 1938) See also Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of
the Federal Income Tax Exemption For Charitable Organizations: A Theory
Of Risk Compensation, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 419 (1998) (recounting that the
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core tax exempt function by broadening the opportunity to a
racially and economically diverse community of learners
otherwise not served.103 The reciprocal obligation, therefore, of
colleges and universities is to utilize its own grants and
scholarships to further advance its institutional mission of
campus diversity. Naturally, just as the government extends by
recognition tax exempt status to higher education institutions as
evidence of its mission to educate diverse students, the university
extends by recognition financial aid to underrepresented minority
students as evidence of its endorsement of diversity as an
institutional commitment.
PART IX
Race-Based Administered Funds
That an institution subjects itself to liability merely by
administering a race-based scholarship appears draconian in
application. In these cases, it is not necessarily its own funds that
have been called into question. Nor is the source of those funds
what renders the scholarship constitutionally suspect under the
DOE’s formulation. As discussed earlier, DOE’s formulation is
inconsistent with the Bollinger cases on a number of levels.
However, another important inconsistency is worth discussing
here. The very fact that Grutter permits some form of race as a
factor in administering an admissions program suggest that a
university may also lawfully administer a financial aid program
that similarly uses race. Whether this proposition would extend
to restricted race-exclusive scholarships, however, remains
uncertain in light of Gratz, but common sense suggests that it
should. Why should a university potentially target itself for
lawsuits for administering race-based scholarship when the racebased preference reflects the donative intent of private donors
rather than the university itself. To be sure, concerns that a
university may endorse or place its imprimatur on unlawful racial
discrimination is the principle operative concern animating such a
rule. Yet it is clear in other legal context that this incidental
exemption from taxation is based upon the theory that the Government is
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriation of public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. See also
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448, 456, (D.D.C. 1972)(“[T]he
Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the
absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
Government.”)
103 See also Should Race Count? A Policy Discussion On The Future of
Affirmative Action, Century Foundation, at http://www.tcf.org/ Events/
033103_AA/transcript.pdf.
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administration of funds simply does not give rise to liability. In
the Establishment Clause context, for instance where tax dollars
are diverted to colleges and universities often reflected an
institutional commitment, the question of endorsement arose. In
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, tuition aid was distributed to parents
according to financial aid need and directed in accordance with
parental wishes of where parents choose to send their children.
The vast majority of tuition aid nonetheless went to religious
schools which provided education at a lower, affordable cost than
other nonsectarian schools in the program. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court found that the Ohio Pilot Project did not amount
to state endorsement of religion because the expenditure of aid
reflected the private choices of students and parents. Likewise,
with race-based scholarships, I suggest that the mere
administration of funds should not amount to university
endorsement of racial discrimination simply because the racebased preference of restricted grants reflects the private choices
of donors, not universities. Further, the Supreme Court in Mitchell
v. Helms 104 relied heavily on recent cases such as Agostini v.
Felton105 to find that a program was neutral only if the government
aid was directed as a result of genuinely independent and private
choice of individuals.
The Court in Zelman gave lip service to the other aspect
of neutrality, namely that the Ohio Pilot Program does not
somehow advance or differentiate between religions. However,
although no religion was differentiated, it could hardly be said the
court honored this critical component of neutrality as a matter of
intellectual honesty. Indeed, the court is able to set this neutrality
concern aside and in so doing, it functionally, although not
formally, overruled Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tip.106
There it was said that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they mad adopt to teach or
104 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, the Court endorsed and defined the
new Agostini test. It proceeded to consider government school aid under the
first two prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403U.S. 602 (1971). However, when
reaching the second element as whether government aid neither advance or
prohibit religion, the court employed the revised Agostini test to determine if
the primary effect of the program advanced religion.
105 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The Agostini test is a revised version of the
Lemon test to address the question of state aid. Justice O’Connor set forth
three new requirements. First, aid cannot result in the governmental
indoctrination of a religion. Second, there can be no discrimination among
different religions. Third, there can be no excessive entanglement with
religion. The Zelman never addressed the question of excessive entanglement.
As in Mitchell, the Zelman court examined the first two prongs of the Lemon
test.
106 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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practice religion.107 As Justice Souter ask: “How can a court
consistently leave Everson on the books and approve the Ohio
vouchers? The answer is that it cannot.”108 The analogy may also
help to explain why scholarships that are open to all races might
be disproportionately awarded to Native Americans because as is
Zelman, where grants did not discriminate between religious and
nonreligious schools, it did not matter that funds
disproportionately ended up in the coffers of 96.6% of religious
schools.109 Moreover, the Zelman analogy is also useful in
showing that the use of public state revenue for race-based
scholarship may not necessarily negate neutrality since private
individual choice takes on new significance in the analogy to
Zelman.
However, because Zelman tuition aid did not
discriminate between religious and nonreligious schools, the same
cannot be said for pure race-based (as opposed to race-conscious)
scholarships which do make a clear distinction in eligibility
criteria. The analogy, however, is not intended to replicate the
identical structure as the Ohio Pilot Project, but merely to
illustrate that a scholarship that is payable to the parents or the
student entitled to the scholarship is directed in accordance
wherever the parent and student wish, and not the university.
Thus, there is a multi-layered analysis of private choice. The
private choice of donors to restrict aid on the basis of race and
the private choice of scholarship recipients to direct the aid to
whatever institution would be acceptable. This accounts for why
a Gates Millennium scholarship or United Negro College fund
might withstand strict scrutiny for each involves private donors
and private recipients without any university intervention.
As in Mitchell, the Zelman court examined the first two
prongs of the Lemon test. Accordingly, the Court never addressed
the question of excessive entanglement of religion separately,
which after Agostini has become more prevalently conflated into
the “effect” inquiry.110 It is nonetheless helpful, however, to
briefly revisit what the Agostini court believed constituted
excessive entanglement because OCR’s prohibition on
institutions that “administer” race based financial aid suggest
colleges and universities become unduly or excessively entangled
with the impermissible use of race.
Left unclarified,
Id at 16.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688.
109 Id. at 703.
110 As the court in Agostini v. Felton notes:
…to assess whether an entanglement is “excessive” are
similar to the factors we use to examine “effect.”…Thus
it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant
and treat it-as we did in Walz—as an aspect of the inquiry
onto a stature’s effect.”
107
108
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“administering” race-based scholarship funds can mean just
about anything and may be overly-inclusive. In theoretically
following the Establishment Clause analogy to its logical
endpoint, it would be reasonable to assume that a university
violates the law by administering race-exclusive funds, unless the
administration of those race-exclusive scholarships were
somehow deemed an “excessive” entanglement. In looking to
the factors in Agostini as to what comprises excessive
entanglement, we learn that: (1) pervasive monitoring; (2)
administrative cooperation and (3) the increased dangers of
political divisiveness are relevant factors to consider.111
To be sure, in a private, race-based restricted
scholarship where a college selects candidates, there is bound to
be some administrative cooperation. Likewise, in an institution
where minority race-based scholarships come under the public
scrutiny of a predominantly white student body, the very
distribution and restricted eligibility criteria of these minority
race-exclusive scholarships are sure to enhance the dangers of
political divisiveness on these campuses. But query whether
these two factors combined render a race-based scholarship
excessively administered? The Agostini court writes: Under our
current understanding of the Establishment Clause, the last two
considerations are insufficient by themselves to create an
“excessive entanglement.”112
Burdensome, pervasive monitoring might very well
suffice to strike down a university administered race based
scholarship under this analogy. Cases where such a concern arise
may occur where restricted scholarships require universities to
interview, select and monitor minority scholarship finalists, or to
monitor and report their grade point averages from semester to
semester to donor recipients as potentially stipulated in the
scholarship grant. Pervasive monitoring may also require
periodic reviews to ensure continued eligibility if the scholarship
calls for regular assessments. Likewise, any combination of the
above monitoring requirements or the combination of
monitoring requirements in conjunction with close administrative
cooperation that may increase political divisiveness will surely fail
as an excessively university-administered race-based scholarship.
However, it is clear that by mitigating monitoring,
interviewing and reporting requirements, donors can theoretically
preserve the donative intent of scholarship grants that so happen
to be university monitored. For instance, donors can limit some
of the reporting requirements by a university and shift that
responsibility instead to the scholarship recipient directly who can
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collect and share transcripts, update reports their academic
progress and certify its continued eligibility. Likewise, donors can
follow up with candidates that are initially identified by the
college or university.
The novel application of the Establishment Clause
analogy, while not identical, speaks to real issue of neutrality that
is implicit in the debate of administering race-based scholarships
that should be truthfully acknowledged. There is no concern
about improper university indoctrination of race as the Grutter
court has already established race-based diversity as worthy of a
compelling state interest. Moreover, there is no concern that a
college or university would establish an imprimatur on race-based
scholarships merely or solely because it identifies potential
candidates meeting specified eligibility criteria which have been
established not by the university, but by private donors.
Although on its face such funds are not neutral to race in the
same way funds were facially neutral to religion in Zelman, it is
clear that the private choices of donors, like parents, provide a
theoretical basis to “immunize” universities from liability. In
today’s day and age, it is exceedingly difficult to justify racebased/race-exclusive scholarships, particularly in light of the
Bollinger cases. Conversely, race-based aid is the most effective
means to achieve underrepresented racial diversity of Native
Americans, native Blacks and non-white Latinos. These
diametrically opposed and unyielding realities will mean that well
intentioned universities will now have to code aid to correlate to
racial characteristics such as sickle cell anemia in order to avoid
frustrating its institutional mission-driven diversity they have
come to value. Race-based aid should be distinguished for a
number of doctrinal and policy reasons from admissions. If not,
form will triumph over substance in the allocation of financial aid
to racial minorities through disguised and contrived correlations
that only reflect the enduring significance of race.
***

